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Abstract  
Where there is no viable alternative, studies of neuronal activity are conducted 
on animals. The use of animals, particularly for invasive studies of the brain, 
raises a number of ethical issues. Practical or normative ethics are enforced by 
legislation, in relation to the dominant welfare guidelines developed in the UK 
and elsewhere. Guidelines have typically been devised to cover all areas of 
biomedical research using animals in general, and thus lack any specific focus 
on neuroscience studies at the level of the ethics, although details of the specific 
welfare recommendations are different for invasive studies of the brain. 
Ethically there is no necessary distinction between neuroscience and other 
biomedical research in that the brain is a final common path for suffering, 
irrespective of whether this involves any direct experience of pain. One 
exception arises in the case of in vitro studies, which are normally considered as 
an acceptable replacement for in vivo studies. However, to the extent sentience 
is possible, maintaining central nervous system tissue outside the body naturally 
raises ethical questions. Perhaps the most intractable challenge to the ethical use 
of animals in order to model neuronal disorder is presented by the logical 
impasse in the argument that the animal is similar enough to justify the validity 
of the experimental model, but sufficiently different in sentience and capacity 
for suffering, for the necessary experimental procedures to be permissible. 
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Pre-clinical studies of the brain may be conducted on both animal subjects and 
human participants. Thus, neuroethics cover human neuroimaging and 
psychopharmacology for example, as well as the direct study of human 
disorders with altered neuronal activity. Here the focus will be on pre-clinical 
work of the kind which is argued to necessitate the use of animals. 
The ethical challenges of experimentally inducing illness in a subject or 
experimental species for the benefit or potential benefit of the agent or 
experimenter species are many. For present purposes, I will focus on practical 
or normative ethics, as enforced by legislation, in relation to the guiding 
principles of reduction, refinement and replacement (the 3Rs; Russell and 
Burch, 1959). These are applied to animal work in the UK, embedded as Article 
4 in the new European Directive 210/63/EU (European Commission, 2010) and 
promoted as a key concept in the US Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory 
Animals (National Research Council, 2011). The importance of evidence-based 
welfare follows from due consideration of species typical behavior. Finally, 
returning to ethics in its broader sense I will consider the perception that there is 
an ethical demand to ease human (and animal) suffering through scientific 
advance which may only be possible through the use of animals. However, 
scientific advances may also be used to improve functions which are already in 
the normal psychological range, or to alleviate arguably self-inflicted conditions 
such as drug addiction. Contemporary views of the ethics of animal use in the 
  
neurosciences may take into account, for example, perceptions of need for the 
treatment, as well as human culpability in relation to the development of mental 
illness. 
2.1 Ethics and legislation 
The use of cannabis, even for medical reasons, is still illegal in many countries 
or states. In contrast, the general use of excess alcohol, at doses which result in 
a range of social and health costs, is legal in most countries. Specific actions 
with potentially fatal consequences such as driving when drunk are generally 
illegal, particularly where others may be harmed. In contrast, driving after a 
sleepless night might involve an equivalent risk of accident but drivers (and 
their employers in the case of shift workers) are much less likely to be 
prosecuted. In other words, appropriate ethical codes are not necessarily 
enforced by legislation and are subject to contextual factors. A full discussion of 
the general issue of the rights and wrongs of using animals - as companion 
animals, in food production, as well as in biomedical research - is beyond the 
scope of this current topic. Briefly, influential positions include the view that 
WKHXVHRIDQLPDOVDPRXQWVWRµVSHFLHVLVP¶UHIOHFWLQJD discrimination similar 
to racism and nepotism (Ryder, 1975), and that if animals are considered to 
have rights (Regan, 1983) then actions such as killing animals for any purpose 
are intrinsically wrong. Alternatively, if science is to progress through the study 
of living organisms, then perhaps experiments on both humans and animals 
  
should be considered on an equivalent basis. The fact that sequences of the 
human genome have been found in other animals has been argued to lend 
support to the argument that to sacrifice the µnon-human¶ for the sake of the 
µhuman¶animal cannot be legitimate (Hoeyer and Koch, 2006). The utilitarian 
position takes the consequences of progressing science though the use of 
animals (or not conducting these experiments) into account (Singer, 1975).  
With respect to utility, the distinction between pure and applied research 
will not be addressed. In any case, with increasing emphasis on translation to 
practical benefit through the consideration of impact, as required by many 
research IXQGLQJERGLHVPXFKIXQGDPHQWDOµFXULRVLW\-GULYHQ¶UHVHDUFKLQWKH
life sciences may be viewed as pre-clinical in so far as its implications for future 
clinical benefits are in sight. Similarly, increased ethical regulation and 
legislation has an impact on the study of animal behavior for its own sake, yet in 
the longer term further developments will be essential both for animal welfare 
science and to further inform public debate as to the legitimacy of animal use in 
general (Dawkins, 2006; Barnard, 2007; Patterson-Kane et al., 2008). 
The ethical codes applied to animal use are practical or normative in that 
all are enforced by legislation, with current European Union guidelines 
considered gold standard. The general area of biomedical ethics is of still 
broader scope, covering also non-neuroscience animal work to which the same 
considerations apply. Conversely, many of the ethical issues raised by work in 
  
the neurosciences are of course generic, applying to any in vivo research, rather 
than specific to in vivo studies of the effects of altered neural activity. 
Moreover, as the brain provides a final common path for the perception of 
suffering, distinctions based on how that suffering has been induced may not be 
pertinent to the outcome IURPWKHDQLPDO¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ. In other words, the 
perception of suffering will be the same irrespective of how the underlying 
neural substrates have been activated, though the likely benefits of the research 
may well vary depending on the field of study. The challenges presented by the 
legislation applied to enforce appropriate ethical standards are in part technical, 
for example whether the anesthetic regime is optimal for the species and 
procedure in use (Fornari et al., 2012; Ideland, 2009). There are also practical 
challenges given that resources will be limited. For example, continuous out-of-
hours monitoring on an individual animal basis might be desirable after some 
kinds of procedure, but even the best research facilities are unlikely to have the 
resources to provide a level of care beyond that routinely provided for sick 
humans. The ethical guidance provided by the 3Rs (Russell and Burch, 1959) 
and their application to neuroscience research (Blakemore et al., 2012) will be 
considered in relation to the feasibility of using non-invasive techniques 
developed for use in human, either by way of replacement of animal work or as 
a refinement. As it is the ultimate goal of those ethically opposed to animal 
experimentation, the replacement of such use will be considered first. 
  
2.1.1 Replacement 
Replacement is the most challenging of the 3Rs as applied to neuroscience. 
Altered neuronal activity can be studied directly in human participants using the 
non-invasive techniques of the cognitive neurosciences, such as 
electroencephalography (EEG), which reveals patterns of association between 
the electrical activity of the brain and behavioral changes, and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), to measure brain activity in so far as this is 
reflected in blood flow. These approaches are for the most part correlational in 
that possible brain substrates are identified without any neural intervention and 
the data recorded provide only indirect measures of neural activity and with 
limited spatial and temporal resolution (Logothetis, 2008). Invasive 
experimental studies of the human brain are conducted using techniques which 
apply stimulation to the scalp rather than surgical intervention. Although the 
spatial resolution is limited, areas of the brain can be temporarily inactivated in 
normal participants by means of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) or 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Thus, TMS and tDCS can be 
used to model altered neuronal activity.  
Over the last three decades, an explosion of work conducted in human 
participants claims to relate recorded neuronal activity to a bewildering variety 
of psychological processes. This work has even gone so far as to include ethical 
UHDVRQLQJWKHµQHXURVFLHQFHRIHWKLFV¶DVGLVWLQFWIURPWKHHWKLFVRI
  
neuroscience (Funk & Gazzaniga, 2009; Kahane et al., 2011). Beyond the 
localisation of specific or more likely non-specific psychological processes to 
specific brain regions or networks, it is not clear what such studies necessarily 
add to our theoretical understanding of psychology (Sarter et al., 1996; 
Coltheart, 2006). However, the contribution of such methods to the field of 
neuroscience is more widely accepted. Moreover, in principle, disorders 
characterised by altered neuronal activity can be studied directly in clinical 
populations. However, such observations may be confounded by the use of 
medication and, whatever precautions are in place, in cases of psychological 
and psychiatric disorder, the ability to give informed consent may be 
compromised.  
In the short-term, the continued use of animal models has been argued to 
be essential to our understanding of the relationships between neuronal activity 
and behavior, for example the mechanisms of learning and memory and their 
disorder (Blakemore et al., 2012). Only in animals and in vivo can we conduct 
direct manipulations of a brain system to test its role in psychological processes 
(in vitro tests cannot substitute for behavioral tests of psychological responses 
to drugs and lesions). This approach is complementary to those approaches that 
involve measuring neural changes in human subjects, but the animal work is 
necessary because the human evidence is largely correlational and therefore 
inconclusive on its own, for example if we study human subjects who take 
  
drugs we cannot know whether the effects we observe are a consequence of the 
drug or of psychiatric illness. TMS and tDCS techniques are promising but 
unsuitable for deep brain structures. Compared to controlled intervention studies 
in animals - using techniques such as micro-dialysis and electrophysiology - 
fMRI has limited temporal and spatial resolution. Computer simulations cannot 
substitute for experiments until we have sufficient data to successfully model 
the real nervous system. Thus for some purposes it has been argued that the use 
of animals cannot be replaced. 
Related to the principle of replacement, further justification of precisely 
which animal species has been selected for a program of work is required. 
Neuroscientific studies in which the nervous system is directly manipulated 
typically use rats rather than mice or some other small mammal to make use of 
the huge body of evidence already collected on the rat (both behavioral and 
neuroanatomical). There are excellent stereotaxic atlases for rats and a wealth of 
behavioral studies provide a sound basis for the selection of experimental 
parameters. Rats are also a hardy species, well able to tolerate the mild food or 
water deprivation necessary to motivate responding in order to test the 
behavioral consequences of altered neuronal activity. Some behavioral tests of 
activity or exploration are unconditioned and require no motivation for their 
expression but learning can only be demonstrated by testing the effects of a 
conditioned cue on a motivated response. 
  
Arguably, the mouse has yet to demonstrate the same level of behavioral 
sophistication as the rat, in part because many mouse strains are hyperactive and 
aggressive and therefore difficult to work with. For example, being much 
smaller than the rat, the mouse is less well able to tolerate the deprivation 
schedules that can be essential to motivate reliable response rates. However 
excellent progress is nonetheless being made in adapting benchmark tests of 
learning for use in the mouse (Schmitt et al., 2003, 2004; Deacon, 2006; 
Bonardi et al., 2010). Mice remain the species of choice for studies of the 
effects of genetic modifications and cognitive effects have been clearly 
demonstrated in relation to genotype (Schmitt et al., 2003, 2004). However, for 
studies which manipulate neural activity directly, the smaller brain of the mouse 
can make some brain lesions and injections harder to restrict to their intended 
locations than is the case in the rat. Overall rodent species give quite a good 
trade off between complexity of brain (necessary to meet the scientific 
objectives) and the need to consider phylogenetic position. Although 
invertebrates may suffer more than is commonly believed (Sherwin, 2001; 
Crook & Walters, 2011DQLPDOVLQµKLJKHU¶SK\ORJHQHWLFSRVLWLRQVDUH
generally considered to have an increased capacity for suffering. Such 
judgements in relation to level of species are reflected in the introduction of 
legal protection (UK Animals [Scientific Procedures] Act 1986; European 
Directive 2010/63/EU) at the level of more neurologically complex 
invertebrates such as the octopus, as well as in the special considerations that 
  
apply to mammals of the primate genus. Thus the use of rodents can be viewed 
as a replacement for the use of primates. 
In addition to the scientific limitations of in vitro studies of nervous 
function raised above, the demarcation between in vivo and in vitro is dubious 
in the case of brain tissue. Indeed, one early study reported the use of an 
isolated whole brain preparation in the rat, which on some criteria was still alive 
up to 5 hours after removal from the rest of the animal: in addition to metabolic 
activity showing glucose utilization, there was both spontaneous EEG activity 
and an EEG response to drug administration as well as to a loud sound (Andjus 
et al., 1967). More recently, an isolated guinea pig whole brain has been 
reported viable as a preparation for the study of the auditory system (Babalian et 
al., 1999) and to provide a useful in vitro model of cerebral ischemia (Breschi et 
al., 2010). Again to the extent such an in vitro whole brain preparation shows 
viable physiological activity, conscious perception cannot be assumed to have 
been removed by decerebration. Logically, the use of smaller samples of brain 
tissue may present similar challenges. The olfactory-hippocampal circuit of the 
guinea pig has similarly been reported to be viable in vitro and over an even 
longer time frame, at least with respect to its electrophysiological properties (de 
Curtis et al., 1991). This preparation can be seen as a significant scientific 
advance on the use of traditional slice preparations to study smaller samples of 
brain tissue and has clearly had translational impact for our understanding of 
  
temporal lobe epilepsy (Paré et al., 1992). However, maintaining parts of a 
brain, such as emotional or pain centres, or even a collection of nerve cells from 
such a region in vitro clearly poses ethical challenges that are different from 
working with, for example, an isolated heart. Thus, in the case of nervous tissue, 
it should be emphasised that replacement by way of in vitro tests raises 
particular issues. 
The use of immature forms of vertebrates can also be presented as 
replacement. However, particularly for studies of the nervous system, there is 
compelling evidence that age matters. Even adolescent organisms respond quite 
differently from those of adults and this constrains interpretation of both in vitro 
tissue studies as well as in vivo studies of juvenile systems (McCutcheon & 
Marinelli, 2009). 
Finally, replacement is not a logical objective in areas of animal science, 
where the animals are the object of study rather than acting as a model for a 
human condition (Barnard, 2007). In this sense, studies of animal behavior, 
which may include investigation of its underlying neural substrates, should have 
special status. 
2.1.2 Reduction 
Rigorous peer review of applications for funding, as well as of articles 
submitted for publication should ensure that animal studies are well-designed 
and appropriately analysed statistically. However, reduction is not simply a 
  
matter of using fewer animals. Rather the objective is to use a sample 
appropriate to detect the effect size of interest otherwise statistically small 
effects which are nonetheless of potential scientific importance will remain 
undetected. Potential clinical significance is also a consideration: a small 
LPSURYHPHQWWRDVHULRXVLOOQHVVVXFKDV$O]KHLPHU¶VGLVHDVHRUDGHOD\LQWKH
onset of symptoms could represent an important advance. With appropriate 
statistical advice, reduction within any particular experimental protocol is 
achievable and generally considered best practice. However, to achieve an 
overall reduction in the number of animals entering regulated procedures is 
more challenging because of rapid progress in the development of genetically 
modified mouse models. These are providing vital information with respect to 
both normal function such as learning and memory and disorders such as 
neurodegenerative diseases.  A consequence of this success has been an increase 
in the number of laboratory animals used in neuroscience as well as other forms 
of biomedical research (Blakemore et al., 2012). 
2.1.3 Refinement 
*HQHUDOLPSURYHPHQWVWRODERUDWRU\DQLPDOV¶FRQGLWLRQVDUHGLVFXVVHGLQ
Section 2 below. The most obvious refinement specific to studies of altered 
neuronal activity would be to adopt the cognitive neuroscience techniques used 
in human studies to make all studies of altered neuronal activity, including those 
conducted in animals, non-invasive. However, as discussed in Section 1.1 
  
above, these techniques are insufficiently advanced to allow the replacement of 
animal experimental subjects with willing human participants. In common with 
all neuroscientific techniques, the presently available non-invasive methods to 
study brain function in animals also have technical limitations which restrict 
their usefulness, in animal studies in particular. One particularly important 
limiting factor is the level of spatial resolution which can be achieved. 
Functional imaging techniques are insufficiently advanced to allow us to 
address the anatomical sub-divisions of interest, for example the distinction 
between shell and core sub-regions of nucleus accumbens. This is because the 
resolution is too poor for deep structures, and resolution <1mm would be 
required. Anatomically it is possible to achieve resolution of the order of 1mm 
with a standard scanner. However, for functional imaging, which is necessary to 
address functional questions, it is very difficult to get images with voxels this 
small. Moreover, the temporal resolution of fMRI is at best around 1s, which is 
insufficiently precise to capture neuronal activity in relation to behavioral 
reaction times which are of the order of milliseconds. Relatedly, the question as 
to what the activity measured in functional imaging studies reflects remains 
controversial because blood flow is an indirect measure of neural activity 
(Logothetis, 2008). 
Therefore, although the same non-invasive (EEG and fMRI) or less 
invasive (TMS and tDCS) techniques can in principle be applied in animals, 
  
there would be no particular advantage to this line of work for its own sake and 
some additional disadvantages. For example, animals typically have smaller 
brains and do not keep still without the use of anesthetic or restraint. However, 
structural imaging in animals will allow for refinement in so far as it can be 
used to verify experimental lesion placements prior to assessment of the brain 
post-mortem. Additionally, pharmacological MRI can be combined with the 
administration of experimental drugs to animals to delineate their effects 
without the need for any stressful procedure beyond the administration of the 
drug itself and the anesthetic or restraint required for the MRI. 
Animal work to study altered brain activity typically involves the use of 
invasive surgical procedures, which cannot be used experimentally in humans, 
to allow examination of the effects of experimental manipulation of neuronal 
activity on behavior. The adverse effects resulting from these procedures can be 
broadly categorised into unintended or incidental effects, as distinct from the 
intended experimental effects intrinsic to the changes in neuronal activity 
induced. The routine management of these adverse effects is described below. 
2.1.3.1 Incidental effects 
Without proper precautions, rats could experience pain during or after the 
surgical procedures necessary to access the brain. This is avoided by authorising 
only trained and competent staff to administer the most suitable anesthetic for 
the species in use, under veterinary guidance for current best practice. 
  
Analgesics are routinely administered to minimise post-operative discomfort. 
Long-lasting systemic analgesics administered pre-operatively are ideal, in that 
pain relief will be in place immediately after the anesthetic wears off. As an 
additional precaution to ensure long-term pain relief, local anesthetic may be 
applied peri-operatively to the region of the wound. Animals showing 
subsequent signs of pain or discomfort are given a follow-up treatment 
systemically and treated topically if the operation wound is scratched.  
Post-operative experimental procedures commence only once animals 
have made a full recovery from surgery. Animals are typically checked at least 
daily by the experimenters and the technicians and at more frequent intervals 
when an animal is sick. Malaise is recognised as, for example, lethargy, loss of 
appetite, or poor coat condition. As a last resort, animals showing recognised 
signs of illness or discomfort which do not respond to treatment may be 
humanely killed. In particular, any animals showing gross locomotor deficits or 
serious impairment of the special senses, or that show other symptoms that 
exceed the severity limit of the agreed program of work, are put down 
immediately. 
The majority of the invasive techniques used in the neurosciences are 
classed as moderate under the UK legislation as they require surgery with 
recovery. However, animals, usually rodents, generally recover rapidly from 
these surgeries and the established techniques used have no long term impact on 
  
the health and welfare of the animals. The combination of surgery techniques 
with systemic or localised pharmacological manipulations is unlikely to impose 
any additional health risks and in all cases animals are fully recovered from 
surgery at the time of any drug administration. Even after an animal has made a 
full recovery from surgery it might in consequence of that surgery show altered 
sensitivity to some other treatment. For example, it might show a shifted-dose 
response to a drug treatment and the objective might be to determine whether 
lesion-induced deficits can be reversed with drug treatments. Interactive effects 
that result in suffering or malaise for the animal typically occur relatively rarely. 
Predicting when such interactive effects will occur remains challenging. 
However, in general, the successful management of unwanted side-effect of 
experimental treatments, together with ongoing improvements to husbandry, is 
a matter of routine in institutions authorised to conduct experimental work with 
animals. Refinement is perhaps the most readily achievable principle of the 3Rs 
and at the same time improves the quality of the science. 
2.1.3.2 Intended effects 
Some aspects of the adverse effects seen post-operatively are an inevitable 
consequence of the scientific objective, in the case of the current topic, to study 
altered neuronal activity. Behavioral changes seen post-operatively after brain 
surgeries can include hyperactivity and increased aggression. These changes are 
usually relatively innocuous (e.g., hyperactivity) and can be within the species-
  
typical range (e.g., slightly increased aggressive behaviors). Such non-specific 
changes typically subside as the animal recovers, and if not veterinary treatment 
may be indicated. Additionally, it may be necessary to cage separately any rats 
which show increased aggression post-operatively. 
Hyperactivity or other alterations in typical behavior can also be seen as a 
lasting effect of some experimental brain treatments. Some of these effects are 
functionally related to the psychological changes under experimental 
investigation and in this case the incidence should be high (approaching 100%) 
because the changes induced specifically relate to the scientific objectives. 
These adverse effects present an ethical challenge: to the extent they are integral 
to the scientific program (the defined purpose for which the legal authority to 
conduct the work has been granted), they are of necessity left untreated. Such an 
experimental program must be legal, but nonetheless represents a significant 
challenge ethically. The successful simulation of distressing psychological, 
psychiatric or neurological disorders, such as anxiety, schizophrenia or 
+XQWLQJWRQ¶VGLVHDVH, requires sufficient comparability in the level of suffering 
induced, in order for the science to be valid. 
2.1.4 Rules and recommendations: The need for flexibility 
There is a clear difference between a rule and a recommendation and applying 
the 3Rs as a routine prescription may not work as intended when a number of 
considerations need to be taken into account. Viable strategies for replacement 
  
are insufficient for reduction to meet this target and the ethical gap may 
effectively set reduction against refinement (Olsson et al., 2011). In other 
words, reuse or continued use in order to achieve reduction results in more harm 
on fewer animals, rather than the alternative of less harm on more animals to 
achieve the same experimental objectives in a more refined way. 
More specific challenges arise when one proposed refinement can be seen 
to work against another. For example, with respect to the outcome to be learned 
about, there may be grounds to motivate conditioning procedures using aversive 
(e.g., mild foot shock) rather than appetitive (e.g., food reward) stimuli. At first 
sight, the selection of an aversively motivated procedure might seem to 
represent an unnecessary increase in the overall severity of the procedure. 
However, such aversively motivated procedures typically use mild foot shocks, 
just sufficient to produce reliable associative learning and within just two 
conditioning trials (Nelson et al., 2011a, 2011b). This rate of learning is much 
faster than the equivalent appetitively motivated procedures in which the 
outcome is food reward (Cassaday et al., 2008; Horsley et al., 2008). Thus 
aversive procedures allow the refinement of studies which require the use of 
microinjection procedures (in order to examine the effect of localised drug 
administrations) because the number of injections which can be administered 
without causing local damage at the point of infusion is limited (Nelson et al., 
2011a, 2011b). 
  
Similar considerations arise in that proposed refinements can work 
against reduction if important experimental baselines are shifted. For example, 
studies investigating the neural substrates of associative learning require that a 
behavioral response first be established (in order that changes in associative 
strength can be detected). Food-motivated responses such as lever pressing can 
provide suitable baseline responses but have the disadvantage that they take 
some time to establish. Associative learning has also been investigated using 
licking for water as the motivated response and these variants have the 
advantage that the licking response is readily established.  In principle, these 
procedures could be refined to exclude the requirement for water deprivation, 
by the use of sweetened milk or sucrose solution as a food reward. However, 
there can be barriers to making such a switch: most importantly, to introduce the 
use of high incentive rewards would increase the behavioral baseline response. 
The incentive value of rewards as demonstrated behaviorally is known to be 
significantly affected by quite minor changes to experimental procedure such as 
a change in the reinforcer in use (Randall et al., 2012). Behavioral analyses of 
reinforcement-value measure responding on schedules requiring animals to 
make progressively more and more responses (such as pressing a lever within a 
Skinner box) to secure the same level of food reward. This provides a measure 
of their level of motivation for different reinforcers, in other words their 
reinforcing strength relative to other µless rewarding¶ reinforcers. Systematic 
comparisons of responding for different reinforcers on progressive ratio 
  
schedules, controlling for calorific content, suggest that the level of sucrose 
determines the reinforcing properties of novel foods which contain a mix of 
nutrients and flavours (Naleid et al., 2008). Moreover, the neural activity 
underlying the processing of reinforcers can show differences in relation to the 
reinforcer in use. For example, antagonists at both dopamine D1-like and D2-like 
receptors reduce the incentive value of sucrose, whereas the incentive value of 
corn oil is more sensitive to blockade of D2-like than D1-like receptors (Olarte-
Sánchez et al., 2013). Thus there is a particular issue with respect to shifts in the 
baseline behavioral response in studies which directly or indirectly manipulate 
dopaminergic neuronal activity in a manner likely to result in changes in 
hedonic tone (Wise, 2008). When tasks are adapted to run with different 
reinforcers, direct comparability between task variants is compromised and 
there may be a substantial body of work completed with the reinforcer 
originally adopted. Moreover, where the neuronal activity under study 
modulates incentive salience and this is not the objective of the study, any shift 
in the behavioral baseline response would be predicted to compromise 
identification of the associative learning effects of interest. Whilst the above 
examples were selected from behavioural neuroscience studies, of course 
similar considerations arise in other areas of biomedical research. 
Particularly where recommendations may have an unforeseen impact on 
the quality of the scientific outcomes, a two-way dialogue is essential. For 
  
example, refinements such as µenvironmental enrichment¶ might seem unlikely 
to affect experimental outcomes. However, depending on the nature of the study 
statistical power may be affected (Baumans & Van Loo, 2013). Statistical 
power could be improved to the extent variability is reduced in animals better 
accustomed to novelty and change but results might be more variable between 
laboratories if standardisation of more varied environments is harder to achieve. 
For example, depending on strain and previous housing conditions, increased 
cage size and other forms of enrichment can significantly increase aggression in 
some male mice, most likely because of increased territoriality (Barnard, 2007). 
Increased aggression can be a particular problem in studies involving some 
neural manipulation but could equally adversely affect the outcome of other 
kinds of biomedical research. 
Importantly, institutional ethical review procedures debate such issues. 
However, it must be acknowledged that the effectiveness of such committee 
ethics has been questioned on a number of grounds. The general barriers to the 
debate and implementation of best practice include lack of resources and 
administrative burden (Illes et al., 2010). Additionally researchers actively 
engaged in animal research, and others who may be seen to have a vested 
interest in animal research, have been suggested to be over-represented on such 
committees in the US (Hansen, 2013). The proportion of lay members on the 
equivalent committees in the UK is comparable, but in Sweden for example 
  
animal ethics committees have a much higher proportion of laypersons, 
including animal rights activists (Ideland, 2009). However, even with such 
wider representation, interview methods confirm that such committees remain 
focused on refinement and optimization of experimental protocols rather than 
questioning whether the research should be done in the first place. Thus, the 
context of the committee meeting may be sufficient to constrain the scope of its 
effectiveness (Ideland, 2009). Moreover non-specialists are unlikely to have 
sufficient knowledge to predict the effects of proposed refinements, either on 
other aspects of refinement or on the experimental outcomes which relate to the 
objectives of the study. Thus, lack of representation by other neuroscientists 
with relevant expertise extending to the behavioral techniques in use, could be a 
particular issue with respect to the evaluation of experimental programs to study 
altered neuronal activity. 
2.2 Species typical behavior and evidence-based welfare 
Species differences mean that welfare guidelines should be evidence-based 
rather than rely on anthropomorphism. Moreover, consideration of species-
typical behavior is fundamental to the assessment of potential suffering or 
lasting harm which may be inflicted in the course of neuroscientific studies of 
any particular species of laboratory animal.  
Laboratory housing conditions are the most important non-specific factor 
affecting the well-being of laboratory animals. In the past caging for laboratory 
  
animals was primarily designed on the basis of practical requirements such as 
construction and maintenance costs, space limitations and convenience of use 
for the experimenter. These practical considerations are still important and 
budgets for upgrading facilities are a precious resource. Since animal welfare is 
a major driver for upgrading laboratory housing, it is vital to be clear about the 
FRVWVDQGEHQHILWVRISURSRVHGLQQRYDWLRQVIURPWKHDQLPDOV¶SRLQWRIYLHZFor 
example, modern split-level cages allow greater opportunity for exploration and 
separate areas provide the opportunity for the animal to retreat to hiding places. 
Moreover, they are suitable for animals with brain implants such as indwelling 
cannulae. 
Within these improved caged environments further opportunities can be 
provided. Standard laboratory feeding regimes deny the animal the opportunity 
to forage which in a natural habitat would take a high proportion of their time. 
Additionally the provision of ad libitum food results in shortened life span due 
to overfeeding and inactivity. Environmental refinement refers to modifications 
to the housing of laboratory animals intended to enhance welfare, for example 
by simulating natural foraging conditions as far as possible or through the 
provision of other VWLPXOLDSSURSULDWHWRWKHDQLPDOV¶VSHFLHV-specific needs 
(Baumans & Van Loo, 2013). Other species typical behaviors include nest 
building and a variety of opportunities for social contact. Nesting and chewing 
materials can be provided as part of the environmental refinement. The five 
  
freedoms, first established by the Brambell Committee as a set of guiding 
principles to promote the welfare of farm animals, are specifically framed in 
WHUPVRIWKHµIUHHGRPDGHTXDWHO\WRUHDFWWR¶Dvariety of aversive situations 
including injury and stress, in addition to the freedom to display normal species-
specific behavioral patterns. However, breeding is not desirable in standard 
experimental colonies. Similarly, aggressive encounters may be part of the 
DQLPDO¶VUHSHUWRLUHEXWFDXVHSUREOHPVLQWKHODERUDWRU\HQYLURQPHQWEHFDXVH
they inflate the severity banding. Yet adaptive cost is not necessarily tantamount 
to suffering in that defending a territory is a normal behavior for many species 
and one that would ordinarily confer reproductive advantage (Barnard & Hurst, 
1996; Dawkins, 2006; Ohl & van der Staay, 2012). 
.QRZOHGJHRIDQDQLPDO¶VQDWXUDOKDELWDWDQGbehavior provides an 
excellent starting point for laboratory animal husbandry. For example, species 
such as the African mole-rat which lives in dark burrows should be provided 
with burrowing and foraging opportunities in the laboratory. Moreover, there is 
evidence to suggest that such environmental refinement may be an important 
determinant of their cognitive performance in experimental studies (du Toit et 
al., 2012). Conversely, exposure to novel stimulation of the wrong kind, 
particularly under brightly lit conditions, would most likely result in stress 
rather than µenrichment¶ for such a subterranean species. However, in general 
anthropomorphism provides an unreliable basis from which to gauge animal 
  
welfare and we lack insight into how the animal in question would normally 
wish to spend its time. Animals¶ choices may result in short-term discomfort yet 
PDNHH[FHOOHQWIXQFWLRQDOVHQVHLQWHUPVRIµDGDSWLYHVHOI-H[SHQGLWXUH¶
(Barnard, 2007). Since the same refinements will not be appropriate for all 
species, it is essential that the effectiveness of environmental refinements be 
evaluated, for example through the use of preference tests and other behavioral 
and physiological parameters (Chmiel & Noonan, 1996; Dawkins, 2006; 
Fitchett et al., 2006; Patterson-Kane et al., 2008; Baumans & Van Loo, 2013).  
Neuroscience studies do not raise special challenges with respect to 
general refinements to standard animal husbandry practices within the 
laboratory environment. However, additional considerations do arise with 
respect to the deprivation schedules used to motivate some behavioral 
neuroscience studies of learning and memory. Such studies may, for example, 
rely on stable baseline response rates in order to assess the degree of learning to 
a conditioned stimulus. For example, conditioned suppression of drinking 
provides a reliable measure of conditioned fear: to the extent animals (typically 
rats or mice) are fearful of the conditioned stimulus they should be hesitant to 
drink. The experimental induction of fear and thirst, compounded by the trade-
off between emotion and motivation inherent to the use of conditioned 
suppression of drinking to measure learning and memory, can be seen to raise 
concerns from an anthropomorphic perspective. 
  
The justification for refinement however depends on the evidence that the 
water deprivation schedule in use results in adverse effects. The weights of rats 
on water deprivation are closely monitored daily since restricted water access 
tends to reduce food intake and routine welfare checks include the examination 
of skin elasticity, to check for any signs of dehydration. Additionally, the 
evidence base includes a systematic study of the health effects of restricted 
access to water: schedules of deprivation typical of those used in conditioned 
suppression studies have been reported to have no adverse physiological effects 
on rats and moreover to be appropriate to the experimental objectives (Rowland, 
2007; Hughes et al., 1994). In the wild, rat species inhabit a wide range of 
environments including desert and the deprivation schedules adopted in 
laboratories may represent little in the way of deviation from the species-typical 
range of intake patterns. Similarly, there is no evidence that the foot shocks 
used in such conditioned suppression studies result in lasting trauma in that 
when tested the animals do not show total suppression, either to the 
experimental context or the conditioning cue (Nelson et al., 2011a, 2011b). 
2.3 Ethical demand to ease human and animal suffering  
The legitimacy of essential medical research is widely accepted amongst the 
general public and also a dominant theme at ethical review committees (Ideland, 
2009) and amongst researchers who use animals (Hobson-West, 2012). Indeed 
the ethical guidelines arising from the 1947 Nuremberg Code required that 
  
experiments on humans should be based on the results of animal experiments, to 
minimise unnecessary human suffering. There was a historic context to this 
directive and contemporary views on the ethics of animal experimentation take 
into account (for example) perceptions of need for the treatment, as well as 
human culpability. For normal individuals, cognitive enhancers may be seen as 
inessential psychological cosmetics. Individuals who suffer addiction to drugs 
or who become obese could be argued to be less worthy of research effort 
necessitating the use of animals (see Section 4). Thus, the interpretation and 
implementation of the objective of the code - to minimise unnecessary human 
suffering - varies between counties and for many disorders there is no 
universally accepted animal model (Nature Neuroscience Editorial, 2010).  
Advances in veterinary science which alleviate animal suffering are also 
dependent on experimental studies of other (laboratory) animals. The animals 
which principally benefit are companion, farm and laboratory animals, thus 
such advances can still be argued to be of benefit to the human owners, 
compounded by potential commercial gain in the case of farm and laboratory 
animals. However, curiosity-driven work in animal science is essential to an 
understanding of the normal behavioral repertoires which should as far as 
possible be made available to any captive animal. This provides the evidence 
base for evolutionarily salient welfare (Barnard, 2007; Ohl & van der Staay, 
2012). 
  
Many scientists and lay persons would share the view that the capacity 
for feelings, both positive and negative, is of central concern (Balcombe, 2009). 
That animals should have a comparable level of sentience is essential to the 
validity of models of psychological and psychiatric disorder. However, it is 
precisely this comparability, especially in respect of the capacity to suffer pain, 
which raises the issue as to whether animal experiments should be conducted in 
the first place. At the same time, points of difference in cognitive and other 
capacities can be argued to justify the demarcation of ethical responsibility in 
relation to species. For example, neuronal correlates of almost every imaginable 
facet of higher order processing are now being extensively studied in human 
participants, including ethical decision making itself (Funk & Gazzagina, 2009; 
Kahana et al., 2011). Cognitive processes unique to ethical decision making are 
beyond the scope of animal models. However, non-human primates in particular 
show compelling behavioral evidence of a variety of cognitive capacities which 
provide rational justification for their continued protection (Mameli & 
Bortolotti, 2006). At the same time the use of pigs in neuroscience research has 
increased (Lind et al., 2007). In turn, the scientific advantage of the resemblance 
of the pig to the human brain raises ethical concerns. The use of pigs may be 
seen as ethically preferable to the use of primates but their use in neuroscientific 
studies is likely to remain less acceptable than the use of rodents. This use of 
µVHQWLHQWLVP¶KDVEHHQDUJXHGWREHIRUPDOO\DQDORJRXVWRVSHFLHVLVP:UEHO
2009). Furthermore, the majority of judgements of sentience are clouded by 
  
prejudice based on species, for example pigs are widely perceived as intelligent 
emotional animals. Whilst a high proportion of individuals may empathise with 
pigs, for many empathy breakVGRZQZLWKµSHVWDQLPDOV¶VXFKDVURGHQWV
(Würbel, 2009). 
Some of the same considerations apply to other areas of biomedical 
research but the issue is particularly sensitive where sentience is the direct 
object of study as is the case in studies of altered neuronal activity. Moreover, 
particularly in the case of disorders which might have been avoided, cost-
benefit analyses take human culpability into account. 
2.4 Getting a grip: Human culpability for behavioral disorders 
Animal work to test cosmetics for recreational use, as distinct from 
dermatological products for what might be seen as medical use, receives 
relatively little public support. Similarly, research to identify cognitive 
enhancers suitable for general use in normal individuals could be viewed as less 
ethically defensible than that directed towards identifying treatment for age-
related cognitive decline. In extreme form, the former could amount to 
intellectual vanity. In contrast, the latter can manifest as severe dementia, 
resulting in significant human suffering and economic cost. However, such a 
distinction is blurred in that many of the new treatments for neurological 
diseases are also likely to have uses for people without disease, to the extent 
they can also improve normal brain function via their effects on cognition or 
  
affect (Chatterjee, 2004). In practice, controlling the use of drugs (with or 
without prescription) is difficult. Prozac, whether obtained under prescription or 
purchased online, is already widely used in cases of mild depression and to 
some extent in individuals unlikely to meet contemporary diagnostic criteria.  
Animal ZRUNLQWHQGHGWRDOOHYLDWHWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIµVHOI-LQIOLFWHG¶
problems such as those related to alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking is 
already falling into a similar category: this despite the increasing recognition of 
addiction as a disease process. Obesity is similarly a disorder with a recognised 
neuronal component which could to some extent be argued to be self-inflicted, 
thus raising additional questions as to the acceptability of animal models in 
obesity research. This widening concern with the use of animals for laboratory 
research which aims to alleviate human suffering which could have been 
avoided through behavioral change could be further extended to raise questions 
with respect to a range of stress-related psychological and psychiatric disorders 
(Lund et al., 2013). Arguably, human individuals should take some 
responsibility for their exposure and reactions to stressors. Similarly, in 
addition, to the direct risks associated with drug taking, from overdose to 
accidents in consequence of impaired judgement, drugs too can increase the risk 
of psychological and psychiatric disorders. For example, there is good evidence 
that cannabis use increases the risk of psychosis (Verdoux et al., 2003; Moore et 
al., 2007), there is some evidence that the use of MDMA µEcstas\¶
  
factor for depression (Parrott, 2001) or at least acute mood swings (Baylen & 
Rosenberg, 2006). In short psychological and psychiatric disorders are 
commonly seen in relation to substance use and direction of causality can be 
extremely difficult to establish (Verdoux et al., 2003; Soar et al., 2006; Moore 
et al., 2007). Head injuries are preventable to the extent that they result from 
engaging in sport, riding a bicycle without a helmet, driving a car without due 
care and attention. Thus a wide range of disorders based on altered brain 
activity have some lifestyle aspect. Accidents aside, given what we now know 
about the importance of the epigenetic processes that determine gene expression 
in relation to environmental exposures, it would be surprising if they did not. 
However, to dismiss sufferers of conditions to which their own behavior could 
be seen to be a contributing factor would raise further questions about 
individual responsibility in relation to social factors such as economic 
deprivation and level of education, as well as early environmental effects (such 
as the pre-pregnancy body weight of the mother) which obviously could not be 
controlled at the level of the affected individual (Lund et al., 2013). Obesity in 
companion animals is also relatively commonplace. The same arguments can be 
seen to apply to the owners of obese companion animals: arguably they should 
know better, but their capacity effectively to take responsibility for their 
DQLPDO¶VGLHWPD\DJDLQEHDIIHFWHGE\HFRQRPLFGHSULYDWLRQDQGOHYHORI
education. 
  
2.5 Conclusions 
Pre-clinical studies involving animal use face many of the wider challenges of 
neuroethics: not all neuronally-mediated treatments or improvements are 
necessarily ethical in the wider sense, particularly in cases when there is no 
underlying disease in need of treatment. Thus one commonly raised issue is 
whether we necessarily want to advocate the use of drugs by way of µcosmetic¶ 
cognitive enhancements which might - like any performance-enhancing drug - 
permit unfair advantage advantages in assessment situations (Farah, 2012). 
Such challenges are compounded to the extent advances can be seen to derive 
from invasive animal work. Surgical interventions to the brains of animals allow 
the precise experimental manipulation of neuronal activity in order to establish 
its effects under controlled experimental conditions. This kind of work presents 
additional ethical considerations in that it involves direct manipulation of 
DQLPDOV¶HPRWLRQDODQGFRJQLWLYHV\VWHPVDirect experimental manipulation of 
the brain might seem more ethically dubious than invasive studies of other 
essential organs such as the heart. Certainly, human patients needing invasive 
medical procedures may be justified having a greater fear of brain compared 
with open heart surgery: the brain is more identifiable with the human sense of 
self than is the heart; assuming they survive, the side effects of brain surgery are 
more difficult to predict with any certainty. However, peripheral procedures can 
impact on the brain, for example if altered sensory experience or suffering result 
  
from the procedure. Pain and suffering are mediated by a network of brain areas 
which thus provide a final common path for suffering arising in consequence of 
all aspects of animal usage, including neuroscientific studies, invasive 
biomedical research on other organ systems, as well as non-invasive work 
which may nonetheless result in suffering or distress. Yet pain is not a direct 
consequence of tissue damage in the brain in that there are no pain receptors in 
the brain itself. Therefore, the ethical guidelines to be followed are general 
rather than specific to the organ system or behavior which is the subject of 
study. The legislation surrounding all such work ensures that DQLPDOV¶
experience of pain and suffering is the minimum necessary to achieve the 
scientific objectives and moreover limited in relation to the likely benefits of the 
program of work. One important exception to the applicability of the 3Rs arises 
in the case of in vitro studies which are normally considered as an acceptable 
replacement to in vivo studies. However, to the extent sentience is possible, 
maintaining central nervous system tissue outside the body raises ethical 
questions. 
The debate around the moral justification for the ethical norms in place is 
another matter. Indeed, recognising the difficulty inherent in identifying moral 
DEVROXWHVDSSOLFDEOHXQGHUHYHU\FRQFHLYDEOHFLUFXPVWDQFH$ULVWRWOH¶VµYLUWXH
HWKLFV¶IRFXVHGUDWKHURQWKHFKDUDFWHURIWKHPRUDODJHQWUDWKHUWKDQWKH
fundamental ethical principles underlying the available guidance. In particular 
  
virtue ethics point to the extent to which the agent - in this case the 
experimenter using animal subjects - can be seen to reflect morally on his or her 
actions. 
Many of the key questions surrounding the ethics of research involving 
animals were raised in the comprehensive 2005 report published by the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics. This document remains an excellent summary. From the 
UHVHDUFKHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYHWKHIXQGDPHQWDOFKDOOHQJHLVSUHVHQWHGE\the logical 
impasse in the argument that the animal is similar enough to justify the validity 
of the experimental model, but sufficiently different in sentience and capacity 
for suffering, for the necessary experimental procedures to be in principle 
permissible (their implementation being highly regulated). The evidence of 
continuity provided by functional genomics has been used to support the 
argument that research has undermined its own legitimizing principle (Hoyer 
and Koch, 2006).  
Distinctions drawn on the basis of species have of course been central to 
some of the ethical arguments made against animal use, principally that such 
use amounts to speciesism, similar in connotation to racism (Ryder, 1975). 
However, although the term speciesism was intended to highlight discrimination 
against animals in a negative way, some researchers do now nonetheless 
describe themselves as speciesist LQ5\GHU¶VVHQVH (Hobson-West, 2012). 
Moreover, distinctions drawn on the basis of species can also be an inevitable 
  
part of the justification for such animal use, based on criteria which indicate 
level of sentience. Essentially cost-benefit analyses seek to quantify the 
suffering experimentally inflicWHGRQµORZHU¶DQLPDOVDQGRIIVHWWKLVDJDLQVW
potential benefit for the human species. Thus, the legislation concerning animal 
experimentation could be described as inherently speciesist in that special 
protection is afforded to primates and all but one of the invertebrates are 
excluded. More generally, the law could be said to be speciesist in that 
euthanasia is enforced for sick animals likely to be suffering in excess of what is 
considered acceptable. The regulatory frameworks require the use of a humane 
endpoint, whereas the very option of euthanasia of terminally ill humans is 
highly controversial. Indeed, speciesism could be said to be widespread in that, 
for example, the vast majority of individuals of both our own and other species 
only attempt to mate with members of their own species. As a species we do not 
love other animals in the same way that we love other people. Any matings with 
a member of another species which do occur are by definition unsuccessful in a 
biological sense in that any viable offspring will not be fertile. Similarly, the 
conservation of endangered animal species attracts far more public attention 
than does the conservation of rare plant species. This wider consideration of 
what it might mean to be speciesist is not intended to trivialize the discussion: 
the acknowledgement of the role of speciesism seems essential to the logic of 
arguments for as well as against the use of animals in neuroscience. By 
definition, hXPDQLVPLVµVSHFLHV-FHQWULF¶WRWKHH[WHQWLWVSKLORVRSKLHVDnd 
  
morality are centred on human interests and needs. As an ethical stance, 
biocentrism which recognises the value of all non-human life in nature may 
very well be more ethically defensible. However, rightly or wrongly, the vast 
majority of human activity promotes human interests and needs. This is the 
context in which the ethics of animal use, for experimental neuroscience as well 
as for other human purposes, are situated.  
Sentience is not a uniquely human attribute and sentientism or using the 
ability to feel and perceive as a criterion for the level of protection an animal 
should receive can also amount speciesism. With the exception of those 
presented by in vitro studies of altered neuronal activity, ethical challenges are 
not unique to the use of animals in neuroscience studies. Naturally, the ethical 
challenges of animal work are particularly emotive when sentience is the direct 
object of study, as is the case in studies of altered brain activity.  
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